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AERONAUTIC RISK EXCLUSIONS UN]DER
LIFE AND ACCIDENT POLICIES
By

GEORGE

F.

KILLINGER*

As nearly as the author can tell from reading the reported
cases there are probably three schools of thought evidenced by
the bench in dealing with aeronautic risk exclusions. First, the
courts that distinguish between the facts of a particular case and
the facts appearing in cases of a similar nature, although not
identical, and that differentiate the law to be applied to the facts
of the case before the bar, thus opening the door for an expression of wisdom and sagacity as may be appropriate at the time;
second, the courts that follow the doctrine of stare decisis, which
helps to establish rules of law, whether good or bad, (at this
date the doctrine of stare decisis is gaining recognition in some
of the cases on the subject, although reported cases on aeronautic
risk exclusions have been forthcoming for only approximately
twenty years) ; and third, the courts that, in reliance upon something like the sixth sense and the accumulation of knowledge of
cases previously decided, feel that a case before the bar belongs
on that side of the cases which permit recovery or on the other
side that require that recovery be denied. Your prospects of
favorable results depend in a measure upon which kind of a
court you are before.
Perhaps the insurance companies are in some degree responsible for this state of flux in judicial opinions because of the
unfortunate language which has been employed in the aeronautic
risk exclusion clauses. Then again when we consider the processes by which the common law is developed, possibly it would
be expecting too much to hope for a uniformity of construction of
policy provisions under the varying facts and conditions that are
presented by such an extensive field of activity as aviation or
aeronautics.' In recent years the insurance companies have
*Member Illinois and Chicago Bars
1. See Mass. Protective Ass'n v. Bayersdorfer, 105 F. (2d) 595, 597 (C. C.
A. 6) (an appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern
District of Ohio E. D.) (1939) : "We think that the later cases reflect a changing
attitude toward aviation, due no doubt to the marvelous progress made in the art
of flying. In the early days each flight was a venture. The pilot and passenger, it
he had one, flew tandem, or side by side, in an open cockpit over unknown terrain,
to make-shift landing fields. Today transport flying is a business;. The air lines
have modern landing fields and passenger stations, and their established scheduled
routes are protected by radio beams, beacons, weather reports, etc.
*
If it was
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made considerable improvement in the aeronautic risk exclusion
clauses by making the language thereof more explicit (not
necessarily because of the judicial construction of old clauses
-being helpful, but rather because of a complete change of phraseology to make more explicit the expressions of intention).
Attached hereto as Appendix A are the various clauses, words
and phrases, appearing in many of the reported cases hereinafter discussed. There is set forth in said Appendix A, by way
of comparison, a number of the clauses in current use by some
of the leading insurance companies of the country and you will
observe at once the difference in the wording of aeronautic risk
exclusion clauses. The above observations are more or less the
natural result when you consider that in 1909 the word "aviation"
did not appear in the Oxford Dictionary and when you realize
that in various dictionaries the word "aviation" and the word
"aeronautics" each have been variously defined from time to
2
time.
Some how the writer has had a feeling that possibly the
insurance companies over-emphasized the aeronautic risk and
accordingly statistical data was obtained from the Department
of Commerce, Civil Aeronautics Administration. An extract from
the figures thus obtained is appended hereto as Appendix B, in
which appears COMPARATIVE OPERATION and ACCIDENT FIGURES FOR DOMESTIC AIR CARRIERS AND
PASSENGER RAILROADS FOR THE YEARS 1929, 1933
and 1939 and some STATISTICS PERTAINING TO PRIVATE
FLYING OPERATIONS for the same years. Your attention
particularly is called to the fact that air carriers in 1939 traveled
41,285,762 miles per fatal passenger accident as against 21,720,674
miles traveled per fatal passenger accident on railroads and to the
fact that the number of accidents involving passenger fatalities
per 100,000,000 miles traveled was only 2.42 in the case of air
carriers as against 4.60 in the case of railroads in the year 1939.
Now in the case of private flying operations, it is apparent that
the hazard is much greater although probably not as great as
you might assume. Take for example, the miles flown per
accident: In 1939 the figure was 81,778 miles as against 44,431
miles in 1933 and the miles flown per fatal accident were 916,846
in "1939 as against 391,334 in 1933. Another significant thing is
ever true, it cannot now be said that a fare-paying passenger on a commercial air
liner 'participates in aviation or aeronautics.' Words, after all, are but labels
whose content and meaning are continually shifting with the times."
2. Note 1.

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

that co-pilot or student fatalities are relatively small, being 7 in
1939, 19 in 1933 and two in 1929. Pilot fatalities run somewhat
higher although the miles flown per pilot fatality in 1939
amounted to 1,104,771 as against 462,486 miles in 1933. Correspondingly, the miles flown per passenger fatality in the same
years are somewhat in the same ratio. Bear in mind that in 1939
there were almost twice as many airplanes in private flying
operations as in 1933, and that in 1939 there were more than
twice as many pilots and student pilots, respectively, certificated
than there were in 1933.
In 1941, to elucidate further, according to the Civil Aeronautics Journal of January 1, 1942, the air lines in 1941 carried
some 4,500,000 passengers against 3,185,278 in 1940 and the distance flown by them increased from 119,517,263 miles in 1940 to
about 150,000,000 miles in 1941, and the fatality rate per 100,000,000 passenger miles declined from 3.05 passengers in 1940
to 2.20 in 1941. At the end of 1941 the nation's airports numbered
2,453 as compared with 2,331 in 1940. On January 1, 1942, there
were 94,080 certificated civil pilots in the United States and
98,1133 students (from Civil Aeronautics Journal, January 1, 1942.)
The foregoing statistical data is given in order that you may
more thoroughly understand and appreciate aeronautic developments to date and that you may visualize to some extent the effect
that this activity is likely to have upon insurance risks, particularly as aviation and aeronautics may be stimulated by the war
effort for the present and in the post war era.
No attempt will be made to review all of the authorities to
date as this would be unnecessary repetition of work, and
besides to do so would be an enormous task which the author
would hesitate to undertake. A thorough treatise on the subject
was prepared by Fred M. Glass in 1936 and published in The
Journal of Air Law in July and October 1936 (Vol. 7, pp. 305,
560). The reader is referred to these articles for a discussion on
the cases and the law as it developed to about the middle of the
year 1936 and this paper will attempt to review for you the
development of the law from about the middle of the year 1936
to date. Incidentally, the reported cases on the subject of aeronautic risks, and causes of loss, injury or death under life policies,
are gathered together in annotations in the American Law Reports
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under the heading, "Aviation, Death While Flying as Within
Policy" Sec. 639 under "Insurance". 3
Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Company recently advised
that the annotation in 99 A. L. R. 173 has not been supplemented.
However, all of the supplemental decisions listed in the current
Blue Book have been examined and the results of the examination
are included in the present study.
Before taking up the later cases, let us review briefly the
earlier land-mark decisions as to aviation or aeronautic risk
exclusion clauses, 4 which earlier cases had to do principally with
the construction of the "engage" and "participate" exceptions,
i.e., the earlier exclusion clauses which were to the effect that
participation in aviation or aeronautics, or engaging in aviation or
aeronautics was to be excepted from the coverage of the insurance
contract.
The Bew case is the pioneer decision on the question of
whether or not a person who is a guest or fare-paying passenger
in an airplane is within an exception of an accident policy providing that the insurance under the policy shall not cover "injuries,
fatal or non-fatal, sustained by the insured while participating in
or in consequence of having participatedin aeronautics". The insured
was killed by the falling of an airplane in which he was riding
as a passenger. In an action at law in the Supreme Court tried
at the Atlantic Circuit, New Jersey, before the court without a
jury, plaintiff was non-suited on defendant's motion at the close
of the plaintiff's evidence and judgment was entered accordingly.
Plaintiff beneficiary sought to collect on the policy and to
recover double indemnity under the following provision:
"If such injuries are sustained (1) while a passenger in or on a public conveyance provided by a common carrier for passenger service (including the platform,
steps, or running board of railway or street railway cars),
... the company will pay double the amount otherwise
payable."
Defendant offered no testimony and the facts were uncontradicted.
3.

14
40

A.L.R.
986
A.L.R. 1176;

69
83

57

A.L.R. 331;
A.L.R. 329; 333-412

A.L.R.

99

A.L.R. 158; 173-216

625;

61 A.L.R. 846
4. Bew v. Travelers Insurance Co., 95 N. J. Law, 533 ; 112 Atl. 859; (1921)
14 A.L.R. 983; Gregory, et al.'v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, 78 F.
(2d) 522 (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1935) (appealed from the District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas.) Cert. denied, 56 Sup. Ct. 157, 80 L. Ed. 126.
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From a reading of the reported case it appears that the
court determined the principal question from what it assumed
to be "ordinary and usual meaning of the words" as gathered
from dictionary definitions and from the court's reason. After
referring to several illustrations to demonstrate the meaning of
the word "participating", such as, "if one rides in the rear seat
of an automobile, is he not participating in automobiling?" and
"if one hires a motor boat and crew to take him for a ride on a
river, would it be said that he was not participating in boating?"
The court concludes, "These illustrations show the speciousness
of plaintiff's contention."
The appellant contended that the word, "participate" theoretically defined and practically applied permits within it affirmative action and is never used to express inactivity. The court concluded that the insured met his fatal injuries while participating
in aeronautics and that the exception in the policy barred recovery. The court further stated that its conclusion rendered it
unnecessary to consider whether the injured met his death
while a passenger in or on a public conveyance provided by a
common carrier.
In the language of the court, "His presence in the plane
makes him a participant in the flight, which is aeronautical."
The court's idea of aeronautics is expressed in the following
language:
"'Aeronautics' does not describe a business or
occupation, like 'engineering' or 'railroading', but an art
which may be practiced for pleasure or profit, and is
indulged in by all who ride, whether as pilots or passengers.' "
Since the Bew case it has been pointed out that the New
Jersey court in that case did not give significance to the
ambiguity, i.e., the double meaning of "participate" as meaning
either active or passive sharetaking 5 and that it does not appear
in the Bew case whether the passenger was a fare-paying passenger. 6
The case of Gregory, et al. v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of
New York (note 4, supra) decided in 1935 is the leading case for the
5. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Bowman, 99 F. (2d) 856
(1938).
6. Bayersdorfer v. Massachusetts Protective Ass'n, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 489
(1937). (District Court, Southern District of Ohio.)
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opposite construction. In the Gregory case it appears that three life
insurance policies written by the appellee on the life of William
N. Gregory provided for double indemnity in certain cases and
that the insured was killed on April 18, 1933, in an airplane crash.
The insurance company paid the face of the policies but declined
to pay double indemnity. The insured's son owned a plane which
was purchased with money provided by his father, the insured.
The son held a transport pilot's certificate and the plane was
registered in his name. The insured knew nothing about flying
and was a guest passenger in his son's plane which at the time
of the crash was being piloted by his son, bound for St. Louis,
where he, the insured, was going on private business. The plane,
was in the sole charge of the son.
The policies contained a provision that the insurance company should not be liable for double indemnity for death resulting from "participation in aeronautics."
The trial court, upon trial without a jury, on defendant's
motion, declared that "one who rides in an airplane as a passenger participates in aeronautics within the meaning of the
terms of the policies" and also declared that "one who rides in an
airplane as a guest participates in aeronautics", and entered
judgment for the defendant., The court concluded that while
the science or art of aeronautics was in its experimental stage
most persons who then had to do with the airplane were participating in aeronautics, but observed that there have been
revolutionary developments in the last ten or fifteen years as a
result of which airplanes "have been developed from the stage
of dangerous experiment to a well-recognized standard means of
passenger transportation."
In the light of these changes and noted facts and circumstances in the instant case, the court held that "the words,
participation in aeronautics, as used in these policies, do not,
properly construed, include a passenger on a transpov.t airplane"
and the judgment of the lower court was reversed. It should be
noted that the result might have been otherwise if the policies
contained the words "from engaging, as a passenger or otherwise, in submarine or aeronautic operations." 7 The court in its
decision went on to say that the expression in the policies "being
doubtful and ambiguous must be construed most strongly against
the insurance company."
7. See Goldsmith v. N. Y. Life Insurance Co. (C.C.A.)
decided by the same court (1934).

69 F. (2d)

273, 274,
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At the time of the publication of the treatise by Fred M.
Glass mentioned supra, no case involving the aeronautic risk
inclusion clauses had been passed upon by the Supreme Court
of the United States and it appears -that no such case has been,
decided by the Supreme Court to date. Consequently, there still
remains the possibility of reconciliation of the divergent points
of view which appertain in the various jurisdictions.
Since 1935 a majority of the courts have followed the reasoning of the Gregory case, but because of the variety of facts and
circumstances, and the differences in phraseology of the various
policies involved, it is riot practicable to refer to groups of cases
as following the law laid down in either the Bew case or the
Gregory case. To some it appears that the decisions are harmonious and reconcilable. It is submitted that there exists a
conflict of authority, but as it is not the province of this paper to
review the authorities prior to 1936, it is necessary to pass that
particular problem at this time.
At the time of publication of the Glass articles only two
cases involving pilots' death had been decided . Since that time
but one additional case appears to have been reported.9 In the
Reed case, action was brought to recover double indemnity
upon the policy issued in 1930. The insured, engaged as a
co-pilot, was killed in a commercial airplane accident in 1937.
The face amount of the policy was paid to the beneficiary (but
liability under the double indemanity feature was denied.)
The double indemnity benefits were payable in the case of
proof that death resulted from bodily injury effected solely
through external or violent means, etc. and part of the double
indemnity provisions read:
"This double indemnity benefit shall not be payable
if the insured's death resulted * * * from engaging as a
passenger or otherwise in submarine or aeronautic operations***

The insured paid an extra annual premium of $1.50 for the
double indemnity benefit. The principal question confronting the
court was to determine whether the provision in the double
indemnity provisions relative to aeronautic operations served to
N.

8.
Taylor v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America. 142 Misc. Rep. 94, 253
Y. S. 55 (1931) Charette v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 202

Wis. 470; 232 N. W. 848 (1931).
9.
homa).

Reed v.

Home State. Life Insurance Co., 97 P.

(2d)

53 (1939)

(Okla-

AERONAUTIC RISK EXCLUSIONS

exclude the risk, or stated a mere condition, the violation of
which could not be urged as a defense after the incontestable
period. The court held that the double indemnity provision
constituted a policy of life insurance within the meaning of the
state statute, and that the provision stated an exclusion of risk
and not a mere condition. The court went on to state, "Had
the insured agreed not to engage in the occupation mentioned,
the provision would have constituted a condition, and perhaps
incontestable after the expiration of the first two years." The
court also held that there was no ambiguity in this case on
account of the coverage under the ordinary policy provisions
and the exclusion of risk under the double indemnity feature.
A different result was reached in the case of Equitable Life
Assurance Society of the United States v. Dyess,10 where almost
the identical exclusion clause was involved; plaintiff in the Dyess
case, the insured, was traveling not as a pilot but as an airplane
passenger when the fatal accident occurred. The court held in
the Dyess case that the insured, while on a scheduled trip in an
American Airlines plane was not "engaged as a passenger, or
otherwise in aeronautic expeditions or operations" within the
provisions of the double indemnity clause of a life policy exempting insurer from double liability when death resulted while
insured was engaged in such activities. The court there pointed
out that "operations" mean only the management and control of
the airplane and "passenger" is used to designate a person who
does not engage in operation of the airplane but who engages
in aeronautic expeditions. The court in the Dyess case went on
to point out that certain cases cited' were out of line with the
better reasoned cases cited by the court, 12 that the double indemnity provision did not include death resulting from "engaging as
a passenger or otherwise in submarine or aeronautic expeditions or operations." It was contended by the appellant that the
insertion of the word passenger was to provide that a person may
engage as a passenger in aeronautic operations only by riding in
an airplane. At the time Mr. Glass prepared his paper in 1936
there were no cases which had been decided by the courts construing an exception involving "as a passenger or otherwise"
10.
(1937)

Equitable Life Assurance Society of U. S. v. Dyess, 109 S. W.

(Ark.)

11. Goldsmith v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. (C.C.A.
N. Y. Life Ins. Co. (C.C.A. 6th) 74 F. (2d) 118,
Christen v. New York Life Ins. Co. (D. C.)
12. Benefit Ass'n Ry. Employees v. Hayden,
A. L. R. 622; Missouri State Life Insurance Co. v.
(2d) 1081).

(2d)

1263

8th) 69 F. (2d) 273; Mayer V.
99 A.L.R. 155;
19 F. Supp. 440
175 Ark 565, 299 S. W. 995, 57
Martin 188 Ark. 907, 69 S. W.

236
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used in connection with "participating in aeronautical operations,"
and there does not appear to have been any case involving that
language to date.
There was a complete lack of litigation prior to 1936 on
the question of whether or not an ordinary aeronautical exception clause would cover the death of a member of the crew of an
airplane whose employment called for constant flying but who
took no part in the actual operation of the plane nor rode in the
manner of a casual passenger. Since 1936, the only case involving
this point is a case which came before the Supreme Court of
Missouri'1 in 1939. In that case the participles "participating"
and "engaging" were not used in the exception clause but instead
the word "riding" was used.
In that case the facts were: Insured was a stewardess on
an airplane and was killed in an airplane crash while performing
her duties. The policy of insurance involved provided under
Section 1 thereof:
"Double indemnity shall not be payable if death resulted
directly or indirectly from * * (mentioning such acts as
self destruction, taking poison, etc.) from military or naval
service in time of war, or from any act incident to war;
from operating or riding in any kind of aircraft, whether as
a passenger or otherwise, except as a fare-paying passenger
in a licensed passenger aircraft * * * "
The policy further provided under a.clause styled, "occupation":
"This policy is free from restrictions as to occupation
except the restrictions as to military or naval service applying to double indemnity as provided in Section 1."
This action involved only the double indemnity provisions, as the
insurer paid under the ordinary death benefit provisions. Insured's
application was dated December 12, 1932 and stated that insured was
a "trained nurse employed as an assistant to a physician." The policy
was dated December 30, 1932 and some time thereafter the insured
changed her occupation to that of "stewardess on airplanes."
At the trial the insurer moved for judgment on the pleadings
and opening statement of plaintiff and its motion was sustained, but
the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded by the Court of
Appeals. "The case is before the Supreme Court of Missouri in this
13.
State of Missouri, ex. rel, Mutual Life Insurance Co. of N. Y.
(Rehearing denied March 15, 1939).
et al. 126 S. W. (2d) 181 (1939)

v. Shan.
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case to review the rulings of the Kansas City Court of Appeals. The
view of the Court of Appeals was that the exclusion provisions of
Section 1 referred to those who operate or ride in aircraft other
than those required to engage therein as a necessary part of the
duties of his occupation, or such duties as must be performed in
order that the occupation itself be performed. Otherwise, the clause
would be a restriction, limitation or restraint as to occupation. The
insurance company did not interpose any defense resting on insured's
"occupation" but asserted its defense went solely to the manner and
cause of death disregarding insured's occupation, and that since the
death of insured resulted directly or indirectly from riding in, an
airplane while not a fai-e-paying passenger, the beneficiary may not
recover under the double indemnity provisions of the policy. The
Supreme Court quashed the opinion of the Court of Appeals and
held that the language of the exception stated in the double indemnity
portion of the policy states dn excepted risk, and that the death of
the insured was the result of an act or event, which, during its pendency, suspended liability for double indemnity without regard to her
occupation.
No cases have been found which, since 1936, have considered
the phrases "aviation hazard" or "aeronautic casualty". Nor are
there cases reported involving these phrases prior to 1936. Some
policies use such phraseology and perhaps at some future time some
case will arise to bring such a policy before the courts for construction. In view of the development which is taking place in aeronautics
it may be more difficult as time goes on to make out a defense which
would be good under either of these phrases. Any proof of negligence
or other circumstances which would tend to overcome the idea of a
"hazard" or of a "casualty" might result in a finding in favor of the
plaintiff in such cases.
You will observe from the Appendix B, attached to this paper,
that the "participating" clauses are first set forth with respective
references to the cases; that the cases involving clauses, "engaging as
a passenger or otherwise" are next set forth with respective references to the cases cited. You are respectfully referred to the cases
for construction of the particular language employed in the exclusion
clause which might be of interest. No attempt will be made to review
the facts and decisions in each of the cases. Suffice to say that the
courts, for the most part, are keen to distinguish the facts in each
case when construing the particular language of the exclusion clause
appearing in the policy which may be before the court. In several
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therein (which you recall referred to the "speciousness" of the argument of the plaintiff) have been severely criticised and the courts
in some cases have expressly disproved both the reasoning and the
14
result of that case.
Some of the cases deserve analysis, and those considered to be
of most importance will be discussed in the remainder of this paper.
First, let us take the case of Spychala v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co. 15, a Pennsylvania case in which the beneficiary sued on two
accident policies to recover death benefits because of the death of her
husband, the insured. The exception clause in each policy was: "This
insurance shall not cover * * * injuries, fatal.or non-fatal, sustained
while participating in aviation or aeronautics except as a fare-paying
passenger * * * ". The insured was killed when a glider which he
was operating fell to earth. The glider was owned by a fraternal
organization and used solely for recreation. Plaintiff contended that
the policy provisions were not intended to refer to short flights undertaken as a form of sport or recreation where a person ascends but a
few hundred feet and remains aloft but a few minutes. The court
held that the plaintiff was not entitled to the death benefits because
of the exception clause and held that a glider was within the exception,
that recreation purpose was of no significance nor was the distance
nor length of time in the air. Judgment for defendant was affirmed.
It should be observed that a similar result was arrived at by a federal
court in a case from the Eastern District of Michigan in 1933.16 In
that case it was held that one operating a glider and killed by crash
to the ground was at the time of death "engaged in" aviation operations.
Probably one of the most important cases decided since 1936 is
17
the case of Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass~n v. Bowman.
This case is important because it is a case which did get to the United
States Supreme Court to test conflicting law, although that court did
not pass upon the issues involved. The court merely granted certiorari
14.

ChappeUI v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 197 S. E. 723 (W. Va. 1938;

Beveridge v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 197 S.E. 721 (W. Va.) (1938)
Moyer v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 9 Alaska 79 (1936) ;
Mutual Benefit Health & Ace. Assn. v. Moyer, 94 F. (2d) 906 (C.C.A. 9)

(1938) ;
Bayersdorfer v. Mass. Protective Ass'n, Inc. 20 F. Supp. 489 (D.C.S.D. Ohio)
(1937).
(2d) 32 (1940)
15.
Spychala v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 13 At.
(Pa. Sup. Ct.)
Irwin v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 5 F. Supp. 382 (1933).
16.
(2d) 7
Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Bowman, 96 F.
17.

(March 15, 1938) (C.C.A.-8th Cir., from the District Court of Dist. of Nebraska) ;
82 L. Ed. 1521 May 31/38-certiorari granted by Supreme Court, judgment
vac. and remanded cause for redetermination "limited to the question of the right
of respondent to recover under the law of New Mexico";
99 F. (2d) 856, judgment appealed from affirmed Nov. 23, 1938 ; rehearing
denied Dec. 10, 1938.
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and. remanded the cause for redetermination "limited to the question
of the right of the respondent to recover under the law of New
Mexico."
Upon the mandate from the United States Supreme Court, on
certiorari granted, the Circuit Court of Appeals found it possible to
get around the conclusions reached in the case of Sneddon v. Massachusetts Protective Association, a New Mexico Case.18 In the Sneddon case the court held that a casually invited passenger who met death
in an airplane crash came to his death while participating in aviation
or aeronautics.1 8 The policy involved in the Sneddon case provided:
"This policy does not cover death or other loss due to
disease, whether acquired accidentally or otherwise, or sustained as a result of participation in aviation, aeronautics or
subaquatics * * * "

The words "aviation" and "aeronautics" are used in the alternative
in the Sneddon case.
In the first decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the
Bowman case it held that the insured was not participating in aero-.
nautics at the time of the accident but was only a passenger. Thus
it appeared that the decision was in conflict with the decision in the
Sneddon case if the law of New Mexico was applicable. Remember
the case was tried in the District Court of Nebraska. The facts in
the case were: The policy provided:
"This policy does not cover death, disability, or other
loss * * * received because of or while participating in
aeronautics * * * "

The insured, a farmer, who himself had nothing to do with
airplanes as a pilot or mechanic, etc., bought a plane located at
Blackwell, Oklahoma, and took title in his name, intending it as a
gift to his son who was in the commercial airplane school and flying
business at El Paso, Texas. The insured went with his son to Blackwell, Oklahoma, where the plane was delivered and from Blackwell,
Oklahoma, the insured and his son, with his son acting as pilot and
the insured as a passenger, flew to Wichita, Kansas, and the next
day the two were killed while on their way from Wichita, Kansas,
to El Paso, Texas. On such statement of facts the court held that
the insured was not "participating" in aeronautics at the time of
the accident and on petition for rehearing denied the same. Then the
appeal to the United States Supteme Court followed, and upon the
18.
Sneddon v.
Pac. (2d) 1023.

Massachusetts Protective Ass'n, 39

New

Mexico,

74;

39
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hearing conforming to the mandate the facts were further stated as
follows:
The assured met his death in an airplane accident on February
10, 1935 in New Mexico. The insured was a resident of New Mexico
and the insurance policy was delivered to him in New Mexico.
The court then proceeded to distinguish between "aviation" and
"aeronautics", saying that by definition "aeronautics" is defined as
"the doctrine, science or art of sailing in the air by means of a
balloon or airship" and "aviation" is defined as "that part of aerial
navigation dealing with dynamically raised or 'heavier-than-air'
machines", citing Webster's Dictionary. The question before the
court appeared to have been: Was the assured participating in "aeronautics"? It seemed that this question was decided in the Sneddon
case but not according to the reasoning of the trial court, for it
held that assured was not participating in aeronautics, and distinguished the Sneddon case by pointing out the difference in the
policy provision, and said that the precise question involved in the
instant case had not been passed upon in the Sneddon case, inasmuch
as in the Sneddon case there was no issue before the court as to the
meaning of the terms "aviation" or "aeronautics".
The court in the Sneddon case emphasized that the insured was
"participating". This court pointed out that the verb "participating"
is defined as "to take or have a part or share in". The word denotes
active or passive share taking and having a double meaning is patently ambiguous. This ambiguity was not given significance in the
Bew case. A mere passenger has no part in the art of the aeronaut
and does not study, apply or advance the science of aerial navigation
The court cited definitions as follows: "Aeronaut includes aviator,
pilot, baloonist, and every other person having any part in the operation of aircraft while in flight," and " 'passenger' includes any person
riding in an aircraft, but having no part in its operation." Said
definitions being taken from the Uniform State' Law for Aeronautics Act, (1922) approved by the' National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which Conference approved
another uniform act in 1935 which does not define "passenger".
Hence the court concluded that a mere passenger is not participating
in the work of an aeronaut or in aeronautics and therefore the
judgment appealed from was affirmed. Thus the Federal Court for
the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals, while having what appeared to
be almost, if not exactly, a "horse case" decided in New Mexico
before it, succeeded in arriving at a conclusion diametrically opposed
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to the conclusion reached by the New Mexico Court, perhaps because
of some. variation in the use of words or in punctuation. This
case illustrates the cases in the first category mentioned in the opening statement in this paper and is some indication to you of the
refinement which you may look for in cases which will arise in the
future as the science of aeronautics expands and grows and as the
English language develops in its usefulness.
Although the writer is unable to find any cases in point decided
by the Illinois courts, in contrast with the manner of arriving at a
decision in the preceding case, your attention is directed to a case
which was decided in the District Court of the United States for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division' 9 Christen v. New
York Life Insurance Co.
In this case suit was brought to collect double indemnity benefits
on seven policies of insurance made by the defendant to Henry J.
Christen, insured, the single indemnity having been paid. In five of
the policies, double indemnity benefits do not apply if death of the
insured resulted from "engaging, as a passenger or otherwise, in
aeronautic operations", and in the other two policies double indemnity benefits do not apply if death resulted from "participation as a
passenger or otherwise in aviation or aeronautics." Christen, the
insured, was a draftsman and a designer of store' fixtures and was
not engaged in occupations having to do with aeroplanes. On March
31, 1931, he took a train to Kansas City, Missouri, where he became
a passenger for hire on a certificated airplane, occupying the passenger cabin, intending a flight to Los Angeles. After flying for about
two hours the plane crashed to the ground near Bazar, Kansas, and
the insured was instantly killed in the crash. He previously had made
but one flight by airplane. The court held for the defendant and
denied recovery.
In this case as to the five policies the court followed the
decisions in Goldsmith v. New York Life Insurance Co., 69 F. (2d)
273 (C.C.A. 8th) and Mayer v. New York Life Insurance Co.
74 F. (2d) 118, 119 (C.C.A. 6th), in which cases the identical language of these policies was subject to scrutiny, to-wit: "Engaging as
a passenger or otherwise."
As to the other two policies, the court followed the case of
Head v. New York Life Insurance Co., 43 F. (2d), 517, 518 (C.C.A.
10th) in which case the identical language was before the court
19.

Christen v. New York Life In.surance Co., 19 F. Supp. 440 (1937).
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which there held that double indemnity benefits do not apply if death
of the insured resulted from "participation as a passenger or otherwise in aviation or aeronautics." Said the court:
" 'As a passenger or otherwise' covers everyone, whether
an airplane employe, pilot, mechanic or executive, whether
a fare-paying passenger or one traveling on a pass, or under
a license, whose death results from his presence on the plane
at the time of the accident."
The court also quoted from the Head case as follows:
"We think there can be no doubt that a person who
rides in an aeroplane, along with the pilot who operates and
navigates the airplane, has a part or share with such pilot in
flying in the air and is participating in aeronautics."
Here you will observe a case falling in the second category mentioned in this paper's opening statement, a case in which the doctrine
of stare decisis is in full force and effect. It is conceivable, of course,
that the Supreme Court of Illinois if and when confronted with a
case involving the subject under discussion may be persuaded to
follow other authorities.
In the Gits case, 20 decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals of
the Seventh Circuit in 1929, the policy there involved provided that
double indemnity benefits will not apply if the insured's death resulted
from "engaging in submarine or aeronautic operations." The insured
was killed in the crash of a plane in which he was taking a short
pleasure flight at Estes Park, Colorado. In that case the court held
that the word, "operations" tends to indicate an intended continuous
and occupational relation, and that the exception did not include the
death of Gits. Further the court held th exception to be ambiguous
and judgment was given for plaintiff.
On July 1, 1937, in a case decided in the District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania, 21 which we will call the Bayersdorfer case, the insured, Bayersdorfer, was killed on April 7, 1936,
when an airliner on a regular scheduled flight on which he was a
fare-paying passenger, crashed, causing his death. That was a suit
on five policies of life insurance, one of which contained the following
double indemnity provision:
"The provision for double indemnity benefit * * * will

not apply if the insured's death resulted * * * from engaging
20.

Gts

v. New York Life Insurance Co., 32 F.

(2d)

7 (1929)

(C.C.A.

7th)

21. National Exchange Bank & Trust Company of Steubenville v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 19 F. Supp. 790 (1937).
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as a passenger or otherwise in * * * aeronautic operations."
and the other four of which contained the following:
"This double indemnity shall not be payable if the
insured's death resulted * * * from participation as a passenger or otherwise in aviation or aeronautics."
As to the four policies containing the provision mentioned, the
court found that the plaintiff had tacitly admitted by its failure to
press its claim for a new trial, that the authorities precluded recovery
on construction of the language in the exclusion clause of said
policies; the court denied recovery on the other policy, citing as
authorities, the Christen case and the Goldsmith and Mayer cases
therein cited. Here again the doctrine of stare decisis was fully
recognized and followed.
Now contrast the decision in the Bayersdorfer case from Pennsylvania with the case which came before the District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, 22 which we will call the Bayersdorfer

Ohio case.
The Ohio case was one of first impression according to the trial
court. There, action was brought by the beneficiary under an accident policy issued by the defendant on August 15, 1933, to Stanley
W. Bayersdorfer, the same Bayersdorfer who was the insured under
the policies involved in the Bayersdorfer case decided by the District
Court of the Western District of Pennsylvania. As stated above,
insured was a fare-paying passenger on an airliner and was killed
in an accident on April 7, 1936, when the plane crashed. In the
policy before the court in the Bayersdorfer Ohio case the exclusion
clause read:
"This policy does not cover death or other loss due to
disease, whether acquired accidentally or otherwise, or sustained as the result of participation in aviation, aeronautics
or subaquatics, or while engaged in rioting, fighting or
strikes."
The question before the court was, "Was the insured participating
in aviation or aeronautics when he met his death ?" A very good discussion of the authorities is set forth in the opinion. The trial court
held the exclusion clause of the policy to be ambiguous and uncertain
in meaning, and that the insured was not participating in aviation or
aeronautics at the time of his accidental death.
22.
Ba.yersdorfer v. Massachusetts Protective Ass'n, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 489
(Sept. 13, 1937) ; Bayersdorfer v. Mass. Protective Ass'n, Inc., 105F. (2d) 595
(C.C.A. 6th) (June 28, 1939.)
(Affg.)
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On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals the decision of the
trial court was affirmed. The court on appeal stated that it was
affirmed not on the ground that the exclusion provision in the policy
is ambiguous, but on the express interpretation that a fare-paying
passenger on an airliner is not participating in aviation or aeronautics.
This case would fall in the first category of cases mentioned in the
opening statement.
A case typical of the cases which we might place in the third
category mentioned in the opening statement is the case of23 Beveridge v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co., in which case it
appears that the insured under a life policy, a guest passenger, lost
her life in a plane crash. The policy provided that the double indemnity clause is not applicable "incase death results * * * from engaging in aeronautic or submarine operations, either as a passenger or
otherwise". The sole question was whether the fatality of the insured
is covered by the double indemnity clause or whether because of the
exception there is no double liability. The court held for the defendant.
By way of analysis the court sets forth a group of cases 2 4 , some of
which involved "participation" clauses and some of which involved
the "engaging" clauses, and stated that in such cases recovery was
allowed, and then sets forth a group of cases 25 , again involving the
"participating" clauses and the "engaging" clauses, and stated that
in those cases recovery was denied. Then the court concluded that
the case at bar belonged to the second group of cases, the court
placing emphasis upon the use of the words "passenger or otherwise"
as unequivocally placing the "case within the principles and enunciations of the above stated second group of cases."
By way of diagnosis of the cases in which recovery was upheld,
the court said:
"From these cases, it is noted that emphasis has been
laid on these thoughts: (a) " 'Engaged' means to carry on,
23. Beveridge v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Go., 197 S. E. 721 (W.
Va. Sup. Ct. of Appeals 1938).
24. Benefit Ass'n Ry. Employees v. Hayden, 175 Ark. 565; 57 A.L.R. 622;

Masonic Ace. Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 200 Ind. 472; 61 A.L.R. 840;
Peters v. PrudentialIns. Co., 133 Misc. 780; 233 N. Y. S. 500;
Gits v. N. Y. Life Ins. Go., (7th Cir.) 32 F. (2d), 7, 9

Price v. Prudential Ins. Co., 98 Fla. 1044;
Charette v. Prudential Ins. Co., 202 Wisc. 470;

Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 188 Ark. 907

Martin v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 189 Ark. 291;
Gregory v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (8th Cir.)

78 F.

(2d)

522;

Bayersdorfer v. Mass. Protective Ass'n, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 489;

Mutual Benefit Health & Aco. Ass'n v. Moyer, (9th Cir.) 94 F. (2d)
25.
Pittman v. Lamar Life Ins. Co. (5th Cir.), 17 F. (2d) 370;
Head v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., (10th Cir.) 43 F. (2d) 517, 518;
Gibbs v. Equitable Life Ass'n Soc., 256 N. Y. 208:
Goldsmith v. New York Life Ins. Co., (8th Cir.) 69 F. (2d) 273;
Mayer v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. (6th Cir.) 74 F. (2d) 118, 99 A.L.R. 155;
Christen v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., D.C. 19 F. Supp. 440.

906,

907.
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to conduct, to employ one's. self, and does not relate to i
single act. To say that one is engaged in a thing is to say
that the act is continuous." (b) " 'Participate' does not
connote to the average person the meaning that his mere
presence is sufficient to participate or engage in such art or
occupation (aeronautics)." (c) That a clause of the kind
discussed in the above cases "means that the death of the
insured must have resulted from having taken part in aviation operations other than by merely being in an airplane
when it fell * * ": (d) " 'Participating. in aeronautics' does

not include a passenger." (e) That if by such clauses,
insurers intend to exclude passengers in airplanes, the clauses
should be so framed as to make the intent clear. (f) That
at the very least, such clauses are ambiguous and should
consequently be resolved favorably to the insured."
The court pointed out that in the case where recovery was
denied there was a difference in phraseology such as "if the insured's
death resulted, * * from participation as a passenger or otherwise
in aviation or aeronautics" and said "the cases appearing in this
latter group are entirely harmonious and consistent with one another,
and, in our opinion are clearly distinguishable from the cases appear-,
ing in the group first above herein set forth." (i.e., the cases where
recovery was upheld.) However, thus concluding that recovery
should be denied, the court went on to state that it was unable to
accept as precedents: Providence Trust .Company v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society, 316 Pa. 121; Day v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society, 83 F. (2d) 147 (10th Cir.) and Equitable Life Assurance
Society v. Dyess, 194 Ark. 1023, in all three of which cases recovery
was upheld, and in each of which cases the policy provision contained
the words "engaging as a passenger or otherwise." The court could
not accept §aid cases as precedents because as it said, those three
cases belonged to the second group of cases where recovery was
denied.
The court also disagreed with the view expressed in the Bew
case and said that it would 'put that case in the first group of cases
in which recovery was upheld. The court found itself in agreement
with the result reached in the case of First National Bank of Chattanooga v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co., 62 F. (2d) 681 (6th
C. C. A.), in which recovery was denied, although the phraseology
of the policy was similar to that in the cases in which recovery was
upheld, because in that case the insured was president of an airplane
comlany and active in its affairs and the trip in which he was killed
was undertaken upon his insistence in a plane which he owned, where
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he employed the pilot, etc., and the court felt that under the circumstances he was "participating" in aeronautic operations.
In a case decided by the same West Virginia court ol the same
.
day that it decided the Beveridge case, the court allowed a recovery26
In the Chappell case an accident insurance policy excluded the disability sustained by the insured "while participating in aeronautics".
The court held that the exclusion did not include an injury to the
insured while he was a mere passenger on an airplane, thus placing
the case in its first group of cases mentioned in the Beveridge case.

The court held the word "participating" to be ambiguous and to be
construed as meaning some active as well as passive participating.
Thus the provision was to be construed most favorably to the insured.
These thoughts are left with the reader. The great -common law
is still in the making. The doctrine of stare decisis is not a dead
doctrine. If you should have a case involving a policy in which
identical phraseology is employed that the court has previously
construed, everything else being equal, it is likely that the same conclusion will be reached as in the decided cases. If the decision should
be adverse to you, you may have a chance by appealing to the Supreme
Court of the United States where it may still be possible to have the
highest court change the law to your liking. In other cases where a
policy is involved containing phraseology which is not identical to
that heretofore construed by the courts, you have a fifty-fifty chance
of obtaining, whatever result you may desire by presentation of the
facts in such a manner that: the same are distinguishable from those
in decided cases and by elucidation of the law whereby you can
differentiate the law to be applied to the facts of the case before the
bar from the law previously applied in other cases, in the light of
the status of the art or science of aeronautics, the conditions and
circumstances in relation to time, etc., which may be applicable.
However, should you find yourself before a court which, in arriving
at its conclusion, attempts to group certain reported cases on one
side of a line and another group of reported cases on the other side
of a line and by this process arrives at an opinion that the case
before the bar belongs on one side of the line or the other, then your
only recourse will' be to appeal, and to appeal again, and again, until
you can appeal no more, in the hope that you may prevail.
26.

Chappell v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 197 S. E. 723, (June 14, 1938)

(W. Va. Sup. Ct. of Appeals.)
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
Clauses, Words and Phrases, nautics" or "while participating
in aeronautics."
Appearing in Reported Cases:
1.

"This policy does not cover
death, disability or loss sustained * * * or * * * received

because of, or while participating in aeronautics."
Moyer v. Mut. Benefit Health
& Acc. Ass'n. 9 Alaska, 79;
(Dist. Ct. of Alaska, 1st Div.
Juneau, Dec. 31, 1936.)
Plaintiff, the insured, sustained
bodily injuries while riding as a
passenger on an airplane between
Juneau and Chichagof, Alaska,
during the course of which the
plane crashed, resulting in the
alleged injuries. Plaintiff relied
on the "Gregory" case and contended that aeronautics had
passed from the experimental
stage, when those who took part
participated, to a means of transportation when those who fly as
passengers do not participate.
Defendant demurred and cited the
Bew case.
Held: Demurrer overruled. The
policy having been issued in 1934
and being an accident policy, in
the opinion of the court, was entitled to a more liberal interpretation "than it would be had it
been older or a life policy". The
language in the policy was considered to be the equivalent of
"because of participating in aero-

In another case on appeal from
the District Court of Alaska from
a judgment entered March 13,
1937, the court said, "Participating in aeronautics" is an artificial
phrase of ambiguous content, and
it was held that a passenger on a
regular commercial transport airplane is not then "participating in
aeronautics."
Mutual Benefit Health &
Acc. Ass'n v. Moyer, 94 F.
(2d) 906, (C. C. A. 9)
(1938).
2.

"This policy does not cover
death or other loss due to disease, whether acquired accidentally or otherwise, or sustained as the result of participation in aviation, aeronautics,
or subquatics, or while engaged
in rioting, fighting, or strikes."
Bayersdorfer v. Mass. Protective Ass'n, Inc., (Dist. Ct.
S. D. Ohio 9-13T37); 20 F.
Supp 489.

3.

"participation as a passenger
or otherwise in aviation or aeronautics."
Christen v. New York Life
Ins. Co. 19 F. Supp. 441
(1937) (D. C. Nor. Dist. of
Ill. E. D.).
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4.

"while participating in aeronautics."
Chappell v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 197 S. E. 723
(1938) (W. Va.).

The Court Held: The insured was
a passenger for hire, and was
none the less so because the pilot
violated his license and flew with
the insured at night.
7.

5.

"This policy does not cover
death, disability, or other loss
* * received

because

of or

while participatingin aeronau-

"participation in aeronautics."
Marks v. Mutual Life Ins.
Co. of N. Y., 96 F. (2d) 267
(C. C. A. 9) (1938).

Insured, a passenger in an airplane, was killed in a crash. It
Mutual Benefit Health & was contended that the exclusion
Acc. Ass'n v. Bowman, 99 F. provision "participation in aero(2d) 856. (C.C.A.8) (1938).
nautics" included traveling in
planes at the tme the policy was
6. "This policy does not cover issued in October, 1928, and that
death or other loss sustained as at that time the commonly acceptthe result of participation in ed meaning of the words in the
aviation, aeronautics or sub- exclusion p rovision included
aquatics."
mere travelers in a plane because
of certain decisions in two State
Swasey v. Mass. Protective
Supreme Courts and two interAss'n 96 F. (2d)265 (1938).
mediate Appellate Courts.
C. C. A. 9).
Held: Plaintiff entitled to double
In this case an accident policy indemnity and the judgnent of
was issued in 1935; liability was the defendant below reversed.
denied on the ground that the The Court held that the time for
cause of death was excluded from reconsideration of earlier views
the policy. On agreed statement had already arrived when the
of facts, the question was, "Is a policy was issued.
passenger on a plane to be deemed
a participant in aviation, aero- 8. "This insurance shall not
nautics or subaquatics ?"
cover * * injuries, fatal or
non-fatal, sustained while parHeld: A passenger is not "participating in aviation or aeroticipating" as the policy clause is
nautics except as a fare-paying
confined "to these active participassenger * * "
pations in the art and management .of the planes and the soluSpychala v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. 13 A. (2d)
tion of their problems." Judgment
for defendant reversed.
32 (1940) (Pa.).
tics * * "
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9.

Double indemnity provision
did not include death resulting
from "engaging as a passenger
or otherwise in submarine or
aeronautic expeditions or operations."
Equitable Life Ass'n Soc. Of
U.S. v. Dyess, 109 S. W.
(2d) (1263) (Ark.) (1937)

13. "Double Indemnity shall not
be payable if death resulted
directly or indirectly from * * *
military or naval service in
time of war, or from any act
incident to war; or from operating or riding in any kind of
aircraft,whether as a passenger
or otherwise, except as a farepaying passenger in a licensed
passenger aircraft * * *

1"0. Double indemnity benefits
do not apply if death of the
insured resulted from. "engaging as a passenger or otherwise,
in aeronautic operations."

11.

State of Mo. ex rel Mutual
Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v.
Shain, et al., 126 S.W. (2d)
181 (Mo.) (1939)

Christen v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 19 F. Supp. 441
(1937) D.C. Nor. Dist. of
Ill. E. D.)

14. "This Double Indemnity
Benefit shall not be payable if
the insured's death resulted-

"The provision for double

senger or otherwise in submarine, or aeronautic opera-

* •* from engaging as a pas-

indemnity benefit * * * will

tions

not apply if the insured's death

Reed v. Home State Life Ins.
Co., 97 P. (2d) 53 (1939)
(Okla.)

resulted * * * from engaging

as a passenger or otherwise in
*

* * aeronautic operations."

National Exch. Bk. Tr. Co.
df Steubenville v. N. Y. Life
Ins. Co., 19 F. Supp. 790.
(1937) Dist. C.W.D. of Pa.)

Clauses, Words and Phrases,
Currently used by Insurers*:
1.

12. Double indemnity clause is
not applicable "in case death
results * * * from engaging in

aeronautic or submarine operations, either as a passenger or
otherwise."
Beveridge v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 197 S.E.
721 (W.Va.) (1938)

* *

"Aviation

Risk Exclusion.

* * * as the result of operating
or riding in or on any kind of
*•Note: Names of insurance companies are not mentioned, because
many companies do not use one
standard clause in their policies and
some make provision for exclusion
of aeronautic (or aviation) risks by
policy provision, others by rider, and
still others by supplemental agreement, varying ofttimes according to
States in which adaptable phraseology is necessary or advisable, and
because such provisions are constantly In process of revision.
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aircraft, or of falling therewith or therefrom or in any
other manner descending therefrom while such aircraft is in
flight or in motion, except
when the insured is a farepaying passenger of a commercial airline flying on a regular
scheduled route between definitely established airports located within said area."
2.

3.

"as a result of being in or on,
or of falling or descending
with or from, any type of aircraft, except as a fare-paying
passenger in a licensed passenger aircraft provided by an
incorporated passenger carrier
and operated by a licensed pilot on a regular scheduled
flight over a regularly established air route betwen definitely established airports,
whether or not the insured is
in the military, naval or air
force of any country,"
"Death (and disability also,
if this policy contains any provisions relating thereto) as a
result, direct or indirect, of
travel or flight in any species
of aircraft-except as a passenger ('passenger' does not include a pilot, co-pilot, stewardess, mechanic, or other member
of the crew of such aircraft) in
an aircraft operated on regular
schedule by an incorporated
passenger carrier over its established route-is a risk not
assumed under this policy."

4., "As a result of operating or
riding in any kind of aircraft,
or of descending therefrom, except as a fare-paying passenger
on a commercial airline flying
on a regularly scheduled route
between definitely established
airports."
5.

"As the result, directly or
indirectly, of service, travel, or
flight in, contact with, or descent from any species of aircraft (except as a fare-paying
passenger in a licensed airplane
piloted by a licensed commercial pilot on a regularly scheduled passenger flight of a commercial carrier between definitely established airports)."

6.

"Death as a result of service,
travel or flight in any species
of aircraft, except as a passenger on a licensed passenger
aircraft piloted by a licensed
passenger pilot on a scheduled
passenger air service regularly
offered over an established passenger route between definitely
established airports, is a risk
not assumed under this contract."

7.

"The death of the insured resulting from service, travel or
flight in, or descent from, or
contact with, any species of aircraft is a risk not assumed under this policy (including any
rider, endorsement or agreement now or hereafter made a
part thereof) or under any
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policy issued in exchange therefor, except in consequence of
the insured having been a farepaying passenger in an aircraft operated on regular
schedule by an incorporated
passenger carrier over its established route."
8.

"Death as a result of operating or riding in, or falling or
descending from or with any
species of aircraft, unless such
death shall result from riding
as a fare-paying passenger in
a licensed passenger aircraft
piloted by a licensed passenger
pilot on a scheduled passenger
air service regularly offered by
an incorporated carrier between
specified established airports.
'Fare-paying passenger' as used
herein includes any person riding in an arcraft for fare, or

on a pass issued by an incorporated carrier, who is not a
member of the personnel having duties on said aircraft."
9.

"as a result of operating or
riding in any kind of aircraft,
except as a passenger on a
regularly scheduled passenger
flight of a commercial aircraft."

10. "Death as a result of operating or riding in any kind of
aircraft, whether as a passenger or otherwise, except riding as a fare-paying passenger
(including a passenger traveling solely as such on a pass) in
a licensed passenger aircraft
provided by an incorporated
passenger carrier on a scheduled passenger air service regularly offered over an established
passenger route."

EDITORS' COMMENT
Because of the obvious good work of the author in carefully
examining -authorities and related material and in grouping the
same, particularly in the appendices, the Editorial Board has deemed
the article worthy of publication. However, some members of this
Board have been reading each new aviation case as it has come out
over the years and the concensus of opinion is that aeronautic risk
exclusions can be grouped somewhat in the following fashion:
(a) The early decisions, when aviation was new, experimental
and "hazardous" in the minds of the judges, and consequently a
passenger, under almost any circumstances, was considered to be
both "participating" and/or "engaging in" aeronautics.
(b) A later period very definitely indicated by the enthusiasm
following the Lindbergh flight, when the courts began to feel that
prior decisions were probably wrong and to find a way out began to
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distinguish between "participating" and "engaged in". For several
years, a passenger was held to be participating in aeronautics and
hence barred from recovery, but where the language "engaged" was
used and he was, in fact, in some occupation other than aeronautical,
the courts held that he was not engaged in aeronautics and hence the
policy covered.
(c) The time when aviation began to be universally accepted by
all courts as a normal means of travel, the distinction between the
words "participating" and "engaged in" was abolished, and the normal
passenger, either fare-paying or guest, was held to be covered by
neither expression, and consequently covered by the insurance.
(d) Practically without exception, where the words, "as a passenger or otherwise" have been used, the courts have held that the
insurance does not cover because the intention to exclude the
aeronautic risk is too plain and too evident to be ignored.
This is no attempt to take issue with the author as to his grouping. Obviously there are cases which support his thesis, but the viewpoint of the Board is that these are the exceptions which prove all
rules.
APPENDIX B
STATISTICS-COMPARATIVE FIGURES INDICATIVE
OF THE HAZARD OF AERONAUTICS
Comparative Operation and Accident Figures for Domestic Air
Carriersand PassengerRailroads,for the Years 1929, 1933 and 1939a
1929
1933
1939
Miles Traveled
Air Carriers
22,380,020
48,771,553
82,571,523
Railroads (Passenger)' 573,256,000
387,956,000
390,972,134
Passengers Carried
Air Carriers
159,751
493,141
1,876,051
Railroads (Passenger)' 786,432,000
434,848,000 451,039,262
Passenger Miles
Air Carriers
75,000,0004
173,492,119 749,787,096
Railroads
(Passenger)'
31,164,739,000 16,368,043,000 22,687,000,000
CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE
(a)
Extract from figures furnished by U. S. Department of' Commerce,
Civil Aeronautics Administration.
(1)
Railroad accident and operations figures obtained from Interstate Commerce Commission reports. Includes "Passenger Fatalities" and "Subsequent
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1933

1929
Accidents Involving Passenger
Fatalities
5
Air Carriers
39
Railroads (Passenger)'
Passenger Fatalities
14
Air Carriers
85
Railroads (On trains only)'
Accidents Involving Passenger
Fatalities Per 100,000,000
Miles Traveled
22.34
Air Carriers
6.80
Railroads (.Passenger)
Miles Traveled Per Fatal
Passenger Accident
4,476,004
Air Carriers
14,698,872
Railroads (Passenger)
Passenger Fatalities Per
1,000,000 Passengers Carried
87.64
Air Carriers
.11
Railroads (Passenger)
Passenger Fatalities per
100,000,000 Passenger Miles
18.67
Air Carriers
.27
Railroads (Passenger)
Passenger Miles per Passenger
Fatality
5,357,143
Air Carrier
Railroads (Passenger) 366,643,900

1939

6.15
4.38

2.42
4.60

16,257,184
22,820,941

41,285,762
21,720,674

16.40
.11

1.20
.14

21,686,515
348,256,200

83,309,677
708,968,750

Passenger Deaths" in connection with "Train and Train Service Accidents" for
all Class I steam railways. (See definitions.)
(4)
Estimated.

DEFINITIONS
"Passenger Fatalities" on railroads include only those deaths
occurring within 24 hours after the time of the accident.
"Subsequent Passenger Deaths" on railroads include all
fatalities occurring after the expiration of the 24-hour period as
a result of "Train or Train Service Accidents."
"Train Accidents" include all accidents with or without
casualties arising in connection with the operation or movement
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of trains, locomotives or cars that result in damage to equipment
or other railroad property in excess of $150 (including cost of
clearing wreck).
"Train Service Accidents" include all accidents arising in
connection with the operation or movement of trains, locomotives
or cars that result in reportable casualties to persons but not in
damage to equipment or other railroad property in excess of
$150 (including cost of clearing wreck).

STATISTICS (ALL AS OF DECEMBER 31ST OF EACH
YEAR)-PERTAINING TO PRIVATE FLYING
OPERATIONSa

Airplanes in operation (certificated
and uncertificated) .............

1929

1933

1939

9,315

8,780

12,274

Accidents:
Number of accidents ..............
1,586
1,603
Miles flown per accident ...........
69,357
44,431
Number of fatal accidents ..........
287
182
Miles flown per fatal accident ...... 383,275 391,334
Pilot Fatalities ...................
205
154
Co-pilot or student fatalities ........
2
19
Passenger fatalities ...............
241
129
Aircraft crew fatalities (other than
pilot, co-pilot or student) ........
3
5
Ground crew and third party fatalities
6
3
Total fatalities ...................
457
310
Miles flown per pilot fatality ........ 536,585 462,486
Miles flown per passenger fatality ... 456,432 552,115

2,175
81,778
194
916,846
161
7
139
4
3
314
1,104,771
1,279,627

CERTIFICATES
Certificated (active):
Airplanes ........................
Pilots, airplane ..................

6,803
10,287

6,896
13,960

12,829
31,264

Student pilot certificates (issued yearly) :
Airplane ........................
20,400

12,752

29,839

(a) Extract from statistics on Progress of Civil Aeronautics in the United
States, issued by the Civil Aeronautics Administration.

